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AUTOMOBILES-RECORDATION OF CHATTEL
MORTGAGE NOT CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE TO GOOD
FAITH PURCHASER FROM DEALER-ESTOPPEL
For a number of years plaintiff, General Credit Inc., has
assisted defendant Winchester, Inc., an automobile dealer, in
financing the purchase of new cars by advancing the purchase
price to the manufacturer and taking liens on such cars to secure
the sums advanced. After the cars had come into Winchester's
possession that concern would apply to and receive from the Di-
vision of Motor Vehicles a dealer's certificate of title for each
car, under Section 46-106 of the Virginia Code of 1950, issued
in the name of Winchester showing thereon a lien in favor of
General Credit for the amount of the purchase price. The cer-
tificate of title was held by General Credit until its lien was. paid.
With the permission of General Credit, Winchester placed such
cars on display in its showrooms. General Credit relied upon
Winchester on the sale of such car to collect the purchase price.
Upon the discharge of the liens, certificates of title would be
transferred to the respective purchasers. Defendants Baker and
Bermudez purchased a car from Winchester which had been
financed in the regular manner. They received a receipted in-
voice showing the details of the sale transaction and were ad-
vised that in a few days they would receive from the Division of
Motor Vehicles a certificate of title for the car and that in the
meantime the receipted invoice would serve as evidence of their
title. The purchasers were not informed that the title of the car
was held in the name of Winchester subject to the lien thereon
in favor of General Credit Winchester failed to pay General
Credit and thus discharge the recorded lien. Upon learning that
the car had been sold to Baker and Bermudez, General Credit
took possession of the car and brought this action to determine
the rights of the parties. The trial court held that General Credit
was estopped to assert its duly recorded lien against bona fide
purchasers. On appeal, held, affirmed. General Credit, Inc. v.
Winchester, Inc., 196 Va. 711, 85 S.E.2d 201 (1955) (Miller,
Buchanan and Smith, JJ., dissenting).
It is a fundamental principle of both the civil law and the
common law that with certain exceptions no one can transfer a
better title to personal property than he has. One of the excep-
tions is the passage of title by estoppel.' Further, though a
dangerous and misleading appearance may be created by every
bailment, the mere possession of chattels by an agent with per-
mission of his principal will not enable the agent to give good
title against the latter, even though the buyer is a bona fide pur-
chaser.2 Hence the general rule of agency that a principal is
not bound by the unauthorized sale of his agent unless he has in
some way clothed the agent with authority to sell, in which case
he may be estopped to assert his ownership as against a bona
fide purchaser who buys from the agent.3
In the General Credit case, Winchester had apparent au-
thority to sell. In fact, from the course of dealing between Gener-
al Credit and Winchester it would appear that General Credit
had expressly permitted such sales. In either event the doctrine
of estoppel would prevent an assertion of the lien by General
Credit upon the principle of agency presented.
An estoppel is that which prevents the showing of the actual
truth, and when there is an estoppel it shuts out the evidence of
the truth.4 Estoppels are tolerated in only a few cases and only
from absolute necessity since they prevent the actual truth.5
The elements of estoppel are: (1) there must have been a repre-
sentation or concealment of the facts; (2) such representation or
concealment must have been made with knowledge of the facts,
unless the party making it was bound to know the facts, or his
ignorance of them was due to gross negligence; (3) the party
to whom it was made must have been ignorant of the truth of
the matter as to which the representation was made; (4) it must
have been made with the intention that the party should act on
it; (5) it was the inducement to the action of the other party;
and (6) the party claiming the estoppel must have been misled
to his injury.6 These elements of estoppel were all present in
the transactions leading to the litigation of the General Credit
case. General Credit, with knowledge of the facts (it held a
124 R.C.L. 373 (1929).
'19 Am.Jur., Estoppel §68 (1939); 24 R.C.L. 391 (1929).
'Am.Jur., Agency §§114 seq. (1936)i 24 R.C.L. 378, 392 (1929).
'7 Michie's JurisprudenceEstoppel 12 (1949).
5 Ibid.
6 7 Michie's Jurisprudence, Estoppel §16 (1949).
lien on an automobile to be sold by Winchester) represented
that Winchester had a good title (it was not customary to in-
form the purchasers of the state of the title) with the intention
that people should purchase automobiles from Winchester.
Baker and Bermudez did not know the true facts (they were
not informed of the lien), they were induced to act unaware
of the true facts (they logically believed that Winchester had
a clear title to the automobile), and they were misled to their
injury (they made a down payment on the automobile). Thus
Winchester had apparent authority to sell, and consequently
General Credit was estopped to assert its lien. The Court applied
the maxim "where one of two equally innocent persons must
suffer, he should bear the burden whose conduct has induced
the loss."'
Upon applying the above mentioned principles of agency and
estoppel, we have the basis for the decision of the General Credit
case and a clear and simple formula which may be applied to
all cases in point with the principal case. The decision, however,
was one in which three Justices dissented and to them the formu-
la did not seem so clear and simple. The dissension occurred be-
cause of Section 46-71 of the Virginia Code of 1950. It provides
in part:
Such certificates of title, when issued by the Division
showing a lien of encumbrance, shall be deemed adequate
notice to the Commonwealth, creditors and purchasers that a
lien against the motor vehicle exists and the recording of
such reservation of title, lien or encumbrance in the county
or city wherein the purchaser or debtor resides or elsewhere
is not necessary and shall not be required....
When Winchester applied for a certificate of title as per-
mitted by Section 46-106, it had recorded thereon the lien which
General Credit held. Section 46-71 provides that such recorda-
tion shall be notice to the Commonwealth, creditors and pur-
chasers. Herein lies the real issue of the case under comment:
Notwithstanding the principles of agency and estoppel, does the
recordation of a chattel mortgage or a conditional sales contract
constitute constructive notice of the lien of the mortgagee or title
'196 Va. 711, 85 S.E.2d 201, 203 (1955).
of the conditional vendor when the chattel has been left in the
hands of a dealer engaged in the sale of such chattels? It would
seem that the cases are equally divided on this question.8
The leading case cited by jurisdictions holding that such
recordation does not constitute notice is Boice v. Finance &
Guarantee Corp.9 The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
said in that case: 'The constructive notice furnished by a re-
corded mortgage or deed of trust in such cases is not sufficient.
The act of knowingly permitting the goods to be handled and
used by the seller in the ordinary and usual conduct of his busi-
ness is just as destructive of the rights of the creditors as if such
permission had been expressly granted in the mortgage or deed
of trust."10 The mortgagee financier in the Boice case had the
mortgage recorded under the provisions of Section 5189 of the
Code of Virginia of 1919, which provided for the recordation of
all reservations of title or liens on goods or chattels sold. The
Court reasoned:
It is a matter of common knowledge, and will therefore be
judicially noticed, that in the large cities there are depart-
ment stores in which a customer can buy most anything
from a nutcracker to a threshing machine, from a doll
carriage to an automobile. It would never occur to a custom-
er that he must be on his guard to see whether the article
was bulky, of large value and easily susceptible of identifica-
tion, and if so examine the registry for liens thereon."
Although the General Credit and Boice cases were decided
on the theory of estoppel, some courts have reached the same re-
sult on the theory that the mortgagee waives his rights against
a purchaser from a dealer in goods or chattels when he permits
the dealer to display and sell such goods or chattels. In Howell
v. Board12 the court said:
. . the mortgage is wholly ineffective as to the excepted
class, that is, purchasers, because of the express or implied
understanding between the parties which constitutes a
8 See cases cited in Annot., 136 A.L.R. 821 (1942).
127 Va. 563, 102 S.E. 591 (1920).
10 Id. at 570, 102 S.E. 591, 593.
11 Ibid.
"2 185 Okla. 513, 94 P.2d 831 (1939).
15 185 Okla. 513 ...... 94 P2d 830, 832.
waiver. The recording of a chattel mortgage does not add
to its actual force and effect. It merely imparts constructive
knowledge of the mortgage to subsequent purchasers and
makes their subsequently acquired rights subject to the
rights of the mortgagee. When as in this case, by reason of
agreement express or implied, the mortgagee has no rights
against subsequent purchasers of the class here involved, the
fact that the mortgage was filed of record does not confer
such rights. 13
The recordation of the mortgage was constructive notice, but
the mortgagee waived his right to rely on that fact.
Those courts holding to the opposite view that recordation
.does constitute such constructive notice as to prevent a vendee
from being a good faith purchaser have been just as convincing.
They reason that where liens and mortgages are found on public
records, any person of ordinary prudence would, by the exercise
of reasonable care, learn of their existence.14 Further, the rule
"where one of two equally innocent parties must suffer, he whose
conduct caused the loss must bear the burden" cannot be ap-
plied, because a purchaser who under a statute has constructive
notice is not an innocent party. 15 To hold that such recordation
is not constructive notice would be to hold that property on sale
by a dealer in such property could not be mortgaged.16 The
purchase of an automobile is not such an ordinary occurrence
as to make it particularly burdensome for a purchaser to examine
the records. 17 When a statute provides that recordation of a lien
or mortgage is notice to any purchaser, it is within the province
of the legislature to change the law and not the courts.18
The General Assembly of Virginia in 1926 enacted as Chap-
ter 149 legislation concerning registration of titles to automobiles.
It provided for the issuance of titles, the recordation of any liens
thereon, and declared the effect of such issuance and recordation.
This enactment, as subsequently amended,19 is now carried in
the Code of 1950 under "Title 46. Motor Vehicles." Sales of
automobiles are no longer subject to the sections of the Code
governing sales of goods or chattels generally.
it Finance & Guarantee Co. v. Defiance Motor Truck Co., 145 Md. 94, 125 A. 585 (1924).
15 Hardin v. State Bank, 119 Wash. 169, 205 P. 382 (1922).
16 P4misano v. Louisiana Motors Co., 166 La. 416. 117 So. 446 (1928).
27 Ibid.
28 Finance & Guarantee Co. v. Defiance Motor Truck Co., 145 Md. 94, 125 A. 585 (1924).
19 Va. Acts 1932, p. 613; Va. Acts 1934, p. 380.
A majority of the Court in the General Credit case decided
that these acts were designed to supersede the former provisions
that a sale of an automobile or a mortgage thereon should be
recorded in the local clerk's office. Code Sections 46-42 and 46-
106 provided a more expedient method of recordation and a
simpler method for determining any liens on automobiles by re-
quiring that recordation be made at a central place, the Division
of Motor Vehicles. The pertinent sections of the enactment
were designed for no other purpose and did not change the
law as laid down in the Boice case.
The dissenting Justices believed that the purpose of the en-
actment did not stop with expediency and simplicity. Their
reasons were somewhat more profound. The language of Section
46-71 was clear and simple: "Such certificates of title, when issued
by the Division showing a lien or encumbrance shall be deemed
adequate notice to the Commonwealth, creditors, and purchasers
that a lien against the motor vehicle exists . . ." The wording
does not exclude purchasers who buy from dealers. The legisla-
hre was aware that a car will probably be offered for sale in the
usual course of business by a dealer who applies for a certificate
of title, whether it be with or without a recorded lien.
We have good arguments for both sides of the question as to
whether or not the Virginia General Assembly intended that
recordation be constructive notice. It would appear, however,
that on this question the arguments advanced by the dissenting
opinion are perhaps more convincing than those presented by
the majority of the Court. If the chattel is an automobile, it
should be pointed out that a purchaser no longer has to deter-
mine whether it is bulky and conseqently subject to recordation,
as was necessary under Section 5189 of the Code of 1919. If
the legislature did not intend to change the law as it existed under
the Boice doctrine, why did it provide by Section 46-106 that
certificates of title would be issued to dealers in automobiles and
by Section 46-71 that liens on automobiles recorded thereon
would be notice to purchasers? Today sales of automobiles are
made almost exclusively by and through dealers in new and used
cars; the purchase of an automobile from an individual not in
the business of selling cars is the exception rather than the rule.
Can it be said that the General Assembly was unaware of this,
or that being aware of it intended that all references to pur-
chases in Title 46 of the Code apply only to that small percentage
of purchases from private individuals. It seems strange that
the legislature was- referring to and providing for the exception
rather than the rule without so stating.
The Boice case was decided thirty-five years ago, and the
relevant enactments were made six years later. From the pas-
age of Title 46 of the Code to the General Credit decision there
had been no case decided which was directly in point with the
Boice case. Whether the legislature intended that recordation
should constitute constructive notice or not, it is unfortunate that
there has been little or no indication since the passage of the per-
tinent acts that the Boice doctrine was still law in Virginia; in
fact the indications have been otherwise.
In a suit to determine priority of liens, where appellant had
financed the sale of a truck at the request of a purchaser and
certificate of title had been issued without notice of appellant's
lien thereon, it was held that although the Division of Motor
Vehicles had been notified of the lien, a subsequent creditor
of the purchaser had better rights to the truck than appellant.20
The Virginia Court said in that case:
The statute, in our opinion, is plain and unambiguous.
The key sentence in the section is this: "Said certificates of
title, when issued by the division showing a lien or encum-
brance, shall be deemed adequate notice to the Common-
wealth, creditors and purchasers." It follows therefore, that
when a certificate of title is issued which fails to show a lien
or encumbrance, it is notice to the world that the property is
free from any lien or encumbrance, and if transferred to a
bona fide purchaser, the latter would obtain a good title.
There being no lien or record as required by statute, an ex-
ecution creditor stands in the same situation as a bona fide
purchaser without notice.21
Would the fact that the lien was recorded have made any differ-
ence in the Court's opinion? It appears from the holding and
decision of this case that if the lien had been recorded on the
20 Maryland Credit Finance Co. v. Franklin Credit Finance Co., 164 Va. 579, 180 S.E.
408 (1935).
21 Id. at 582. 180 S.E. 408, 409.
title, a subsequent creditor or bona fide purchaser could not
have won over the lienholder. Yet the purchaser was clothed
with apparent ownership. The Court was not concerned with
the doctrine of estoppel since there was a specific statutory pro-
vision covering the situation.
In Universal Credit Co. v. Botetourt Motor Co.22 the Court
said:
When applications are made within such time (ten days
from acquisition of lien or sale) notice to all persons, in-
cluding the Commonwealth, dates from the day on which
the liens were acquired.23
The Court was referring to the application for certificate of title,
and it is not to be implied that purchasers from persons having
apparent title are exempt from the provisions of the Code. The
Court says all persons will be on notice. Again in Staunton In-
dustrial Loan Corp. v. Wilson2' it was said by the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit:
In Virginia today, a man would not buy an automobile
on the strength of possession, for the sole evidence of owner-
ship of a motor vehicle is the registered title .... So, too, a
creditor must not be misled by possession, but must look
to the title certificate, and when a lien is registered thereon
notice is given, be the mortgage oral or written.25
It would certainly not seem that such broad language refers only
to the small number of purchasers who buy from private indi-
viduals not dealing in automobiles.
Despite all inferences from the cases in Virginia from 1926 to
1955, the Supreme Court of Appeals in the case under comment
has held in effect that possession is title in the overwhelming
majority of transactions marking the sale of automobiles. It is
submitted that whether or not recordation of a lien or encum-
brance should be constructive notice to purchasers is a matter
to be determined by the legislature. It seems that the common
"2 180 Va. 159, 21 S.E.2d 800 (1942).
Id. at 174 21 S.E.2d 800, 805.
*4 190 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1951).
Ild. at 709.
notice statutes are insufficient in many jurisdictions, including
Virginia, to provide that such recordation shall be constructive
notice. In cases involving purchasers of automobiles from dealers
such statutes do no more than provide a wide field for specula-
tion by the courts as to the intent of the legislature. I the Gener-
al Assembly intends that such recordation shall constitute no-
tice to purchasers from dealers it must go further and state its
intentions in express terms.
G. Duane Holloway
